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1 Introduction
In a previous paper an intensional theory of relations was formulated [Plo90].
It was intended as a formalisation of some of the ideas of Situation Theory
concerning relations, assignments, states-of-affairs and facts; it was hoped it
could serve as a springboard for formalising other notions especially those
concerning situations and propositions. The method chosen was to present
a formal theory in a variation of classical first-order logic allowing terms
with bound variables (and also quantification over function variables, but
no axioms of choice).
One infelicity of this work was that not every formula corresponded to a
state-of-affairs according to a certain notion of internal definability; indeed
one could show such correspondences inconsistent with the theory. Jon
Barwise suggested changing the logic to allow partial predicates and partial
functions. The idea of using a 3-valued approach is an old one: see [Fef84]
for general information about results closely related to those given below.
Another infelicity, pointed out by Peter Aczel, was that the logic formalised
part of the metalanguage of the structures concerned, and these structures
already had their own notion of proposition or, better, state-of-affairs. This
meant that there was a repetition of logical apparatus; for example the
logical conjunction was replicated by a conjunction for soas.
In this paper we present a non-standard logic for our structures. It is
a type-free intensional logic, and is also in the tradition of Curry’s illative
logic [HS86]; see also [AczN, FM87, Smi84, MA88]. The logic has two judg-
ments: that an object is a fact and that an object is a state-of-affairs (cf.
truth and proposition). Objects are given using a variant of the traditional
situation theory notation which is more standard, logically speaking, with
explicit negation and quantification (see also [Bar87]). No metalinguistic
apparatus is employed.
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In Section 2 we present such illative logic in general. Consistency and
completeness theorems hold. Such logics seem appropriate when formalis-
ing structures of the kind we consider, which are very close to Aczel’s Frege
structures [Acz80]. A theory of relations is given in Section 3; it is intended
as an illative replacement for the theory in [Plo90]. Since the logical appa-
ratus is built-in the theory looks a good deal simpler than the previous one.
In Section 4 we compare illative theories to standard ones and show every
illative theory can be conservatively extended to a standard one (although
we do not settle the question of the relation of the present theory to the pre-
vious one). One can interpret this result in favour of the illative approach:
the price paid for the use of a standard theory gains no more power. In
Section 5 we (partially) follow Barwise’s suggestion and consider a general
3-valued logic with partial predicates. Again we have a conservative exten-
sion result over illative logic. What is more we get that every formula is
internally definable (actually, in a stronger sense than conjectured by Bar-
wise). We interpret this result as even more favourable to illative logic: not
only can one not prove more, one cannot even express more. It would be very
interesting to take up the other suggestion of partial functions, especially
considering the kind of model-theoretic work in [Bar87].
2 Illative Logic
We need a language of terms over a signature which consists of a set of
functional symbols, F , each of given arity ((n1, . . . , nk), n) with n, ni ≥ 0.
The symbols ⊥ (of arity ((), 0)), ∧,∨, |,⊃, = (of arity ((), 2)) and ∃, ∀ (of
arity ((1),0)), are always included. Then the terms and functional terms
on the signature are generated from a given countable set of variables x by
stipulating that
1. any variable is a term
2. if F is a functional symbol of arity ((n1, . . . , nk), n) and ft1, . . . , ftk
are function terms of arities n1, . . . , nk and t1, . . . , tn are terms then
F (ft1, . . . , ftk, t1, . . . , tn) is a term
3. if t is a term and x1, . . . , xn are distinct variables then (x1, . . . , xn)t is
a function term of arity n (n ≥ 0)
In the last clause x1, . . . , xn bind any free occurrences in t. We do not
distinguish α-equivalent terms, by which is meant terms equivalent up to
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renaming of bound variables. We employ infix and other notational devices
as appropriate. For example, we write ϕ ∧ ψ rather than ∧(ϕ,ψ) and ∃xϕ
rather than ∃((x)ϕ).
Now we explain judgments, sequents and rules. A judgment has either of
two forms: ϕ or Sϕ where ϕ is a term (read the first as “ϕ is true” and the
second as “ϕ is a state-of-affairs”). A sequent has the form Γ ⇒ J where J
is a judgment and Γ is a finite set of judgments. An n-ary rule is a set of
(n + 1)tuples of sequents and is usually given in a schematic form
seq1, . . . , seqn
seq
where schematic variables and side-conditions may be employed. We also
use the form
(Γ1) (Γn)
J1 . . . Jn
J
meaning seqi is Γ,Γi ⇒ Ji and seq is Γ ⇒ J (comma means union); empty
Γi are omitted. The horizontal line is omitted when n = 0, in either case.
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Structural Rules





Γ ⇒ J ′ (J ′ in Γ′), Γ′ ⇒ J ′′
Γ ⇒ J ′′
Substitution
Γ[x1, . . . , xn] ⇒ J [x1, . . . , xn]




Absurdity (SI ⊥) S ⊥
(E ⊥) ⊥
J
Conjunction (SI∧) Sϕ Sψ
S(ϕ ∧ ψ)





(E∧) ϕ ∧ ψ
ϕ,ψ
(meaning two rules)
Disjunction (SI∨) Sϕ Sψ
S(ϕ ∨ ψ)
(SE∨) S(ϕ ∨ ψ)
Sϕ,Sψ
(meaning two rules)
(I∨) 1. S(ϕ ∨ ψ) ϕ
ϕ ∨ ψ
2.
S(ϕ ∨ ψ) ψ
ϕ ∨ ψ
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Restriction (SI |) Sϕ ψ
S(ϕ | ψ)
(SE |) S(ϕ | ψ)
Sϕ,Sψ
(meaning two rules)
(I |) ϕ ψ
ϕ | ψ








(SE ⊃) 1. S(ϕ ⊃ ψ)
Sϕ
2.






(E ⊃) ϕ ⊃ ψ ϕ
ψ
Law of the Excluded Middle
Sϕ
ϕ ∨ ¬ϕ
(where ¬ϕ =def ϕ ⊃⊥)
Existential Quantification
(S∃I) Γ ⇒ Sϕ[x]
Γ ⇒ S(∃xϕ[x])






(∃E) Γ ⇒ ∃xϕ[x] Γ, ϕ[x] ⇒ J
Γ ⇒ J
(x not free in Γ or J )
Universal Quantification
(S∀I) Γ ⇒ Sϕ[x]
Γ ⇒ S(∀xϕ[x])
(x not free in Γ)
(S∀E) S(∀x ϕ[x])
Sϕ[t]
(∀I) Γ ⇒ ϕ[x]
Γ ⇒ ∀xϕ[x]




Totality S(t = u)





t = u u = v
t = v
Congruence
ft1 = ft′1 . . . ftk = ft
′
k t1 = t
′
1 . . . tn = t
′
n




1, . . . , t′n)
(Here the equality judgments between function terms are abbreviations:
(x1, . . . , xn)t = (x1, . . . , xn)t′ abbreviates ∀x1 . . . ∀xn t = t′).
Judgment Congruence 1.




ϕ ϕ = ψ
ψ
Finally, a proof of a sequent seq from a set T of sequents is a list seq1, . . . , seqn
with seq = seqn and where each seqi either is in T or follows from the pre-
vious sequents by an application of a rule: we write T ` seq when there is
a proof of seq from T .
Now we turn to semantics and explain interpretations which are minor
variants of Aczel’s Frege structures and have the form
M = 〈〈Ob,Fn〉n≥0, Soa, Fact, H〉
where 〈Ob,Fn〉n≥0 is an explicitly closed family in Aczel’s sense, where
Fact ⊂ Soa ⊂ Ob and where for any functional symbol F which has ar-
ity ((n1, . . . , nk), n), H(F ): Fn1 × . . .×Fnk ×Obn → Ob is an F-functional
in (a minor variant of) the sense of Aczel. Furthermore the following logical
schemas hold (writing FM for H(F )):
Absurdity ⊥M is in Soa but not Fact.
Conjunction 1. a ∧M b is in Soa iff a and b are.
2. a ∧M b is in Fact iff a and b are.
Disjunction 1. a ∨M b is in Soa iff a and b are.
2. a ∨M b is in Fact iff it is in Soa and
either a or b is in Fact.
Restriction 1. a |M b is in Soa iff a is and b is in Fact.
2. a |M b is in Fact iff a and b are.
Sequential Implication 1. a ⊃M b is in Soa iff a is and also
if a is in Fact then b is in Soa.
2. a ⊃M b is in Fact, iff it is in Soa
and if a is in Fact then so is b.
Existential Quantification 1. For any f in F1, ∃M(f) is in Soa
iff every f(a) is.
2. For any f in F1,∃M(f) is in Fact
iff it is in Soa and some f(a) is.
Universal Quantification 1. For any f in F1, ∀M(f) is in Soa
iff every f(a) is.
2. For any f in F1, ∀M(f) is in Fact
iff every f(a) is.
Equality a = b is in Soa and is in Fact iff a and b are equal.
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An assignment is a function, s, from variables to objects. One defines
tM[s] in Ob and ftM[s] in Fn (ft a function term of arity n) in a straightfor-
ward way (cf. [Bar87, Plo90]). The judgments are interpreted by: M |=s t
(resp S t) iff tM[s] is in Fact(resp Soa). Then sequents are interpreted by:
M |= (Γ ⇒ J) iff for any s if M |=s J ′ (for every J ′ in Γ) then M |=s J .
And, finally, logical validity is defined by: T |= seq iff whenever for any M,
M |= seq′ (for every seq′ in T ) then M |= seq.
Then a variation on standard Henkin-type arguments shows that
Consistency and Completeness Theorem: For any set T of sequents
and any sequent seq
T ` seq iff T |= seq
The connectives all have a certain monotone character. Proof-theoretically
this can be expressed as a derived rule. Let Γ : ϕ ≤ ψ abbreviate the three
sequents (Γ,Sϕ ⇒ Sψ), (Γ, ϕ ⇒ ψ) and (Γ,Sϕ,ψ ⇒ ϕ). Then the following
is a derived rule:
Γ : ϕ ≤ ψ Γ : ϕ′ ≤ ψ′
Γ : ϕ op ϕ′ ≤ ψ op ψ′
where op is any of ∧,∨, |,⊃. Also
Γ : ϕ[x] ≤ ψ[x] (x not free inΓ)
Γ : Qxϕ[x] ≤ Qxψ[x]
is a derived rule where Q is either of ∃, ∀. In terms of interpretations, for a, b
in Ob, write a ≤ b to mean that (1) if a is in Soa then so is b and (2) if a is
in Soa then a is in Fact iff b is. Then the connectives are monotone in that
if a ≤ b, a′ ≤ b′ then a opMa′ ≤ b opMb′ and similarly for the quantifiers.
One can adopt other monotone connectives and quantifiers. For example































(x not free in T )
(SE∃p)






Γ ⇒ ∃pxϕ[x] Γ, ϕ[x] ⇒ J (x not free in Γor J)
Γ ⇒ J
This corresponds to the parallel view of unsaturated states-of-affairs in [Plo90].
The use of S∃x ϕ[x] in (SE∃p) is a trick to get the effect of “∀xSϕ[x]”, so
to say. Semantically the appropriate logical schemas would be
Parallel Disjunction 1. a ∨Mp b is in Soa iff either both are
or at least one is in Fact.
2. a ∨Mp b is in Fact iff one of a, b is.
Parallel Existential Quantification 1. For any f in F1, ∃Mp (f) is
in Soa iff either every f(a) is
or at least one is in Fact.
2. For any f in F1, ∃Mp (f) is in
Fact if some f(a) is.
The extended system is still consistent, we conjecture it is also complete.
3 A Theory of Relations
First we need a signature with functional symbols as above together with
0, NIL (of arity ((),0)) ARITY, +1, ASS (of arity (( ), 1)), ≤, ≺, ::, REL,
PRED (of arity (( ), 2) ) and AC (of arity ((1),2) ), ρ (of arity ((1),1)) and
LC (of arity ((2),2)). Here 0, ARITY, +1,≤, AC are for arities (taken to
be natural numbers); we write (cases t zero u succ x.v) for AC((x)v, t, u).
And ASS, ::, ≺, LC are for assignments (taken to be sequences of objects);
we write (cases t nil u cons x, y.v) for LC((x, y)v, t, u) and REL, PRED, ρ
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are for relations; we write ρux.ϕ for ρ((x)ϕ, u). We also adopt some other
evident notational conventions for symbols of arity of the form ((), n).
The theory is given as a set of sequents and we write J for ∅ ⇒ J .
Arities Type SARITY (x), ARITY (0), ARITY (x) ⊃ ARITY (x + 1)
Cases cases 0 zero u succ x.v = u
cases (t + 1) zero u succ x.v[x] = v[t]
Induction ϕ[0], ∀xARITY (x) ⊃ (ϕ[x] ⊃ ϕ[x + 1]), ARITY (t) ⇒ ϕ[t]
One can formulate a rule of induction which seems to be stronger
Order Definition
t ≤ u ≡ ARITY (t) ∧ARITY (u)∧
((t = 0) ∨ ∃x∃y t = x + 1 ∧ u = y + 1 ∧ x ≤ y)
Here ϕ ≡ ψ abbreviates (ϕ ⊃ ψ) ∧ (ψ ⊃ ϕ)
Assignments Assignment Definition ASS(t, u) ≡ ARITY (u) ∧
((t = NIL ∧ u = 0) ∨ ∃x∃y∃z t = x :: y ∧
u = z + 1 ∧ASS(y, z))
Cases cases NIL nil u cons x, y.v = u
cases t :: t′ nil u cons x, y.v[x, y] = v[t, t′]
Prefix t ≺ u ≡ ASS(t) ∧ASS(u) ∧
(t = NIL ∨ ∃x∃y∃y′t = x :: y∧
u = x :: y′ ∧ y ≺ y′)
Here ASS(v) abbreviates ∃mASS(v,m). One can derive an induction
axiom:
ϕ[NIL], ∀lASS(l) ⊃ (ϕ[l] ⊃ ∀xϕ[x :: l]), ASS(u) ⇒ ϕ[u].
Relations REL(t, u) ∧REL(t, v) ⊃ u = v ∧ARITY (u)
Predication SPRED(t, u) ⇒ ∃lREL(t, l) ∧ASS(u, l)
Individuation PRED(t, u) = PRED(t′, u′) ⊃ t = t′ ∧ u = u′
Abstraction REL(ρuxϕ, v) ≡ (u = v) ∧ARITY (v)
ASS(t, u) : PRED(ρuxϕ[x], t) ∼ ϕ[t]
Here Γ : ϕ ∼ ψ abbreviates four sequents: (Γ, ϕ ⇒ ψ), (Γ, ψ ⇒ ϕ),
(Γ,Sϕ ⇒ Sψ), (Γ,Sψ ⇒ Sϕ) (and the colon is omitted if Γ is empty).
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The traditional predication and relation abstraction notation of situation
theory can be rederived; our idea is that the negation and quantification
implicit there is here implicit in the logic. First we get positive unsaturated
basic states-of-affairs back:
〈〈t, u〉〉 =def ∃l∃m∃y(l ≤ m ∧REL(t,m) ∧ASS(u, l) ∧ASS(y, m) ∧ u ≺ y)
&PRED(t, y)









Then the general case is
〈〈t, u; v〉〉 =def (v = 0 + 1&〈〈t, u〉〉) ∨ (v = 0&¬〈〈t, u〉〉)
Abstraction is given by:
[x1, . . . , xn | ϕ] =def ρny let x1, . . . , xn be y in ϕ
using numerals, n and where (let be u in ϕ) stands for ϕ and let x1, . . . , xn+1
be u in ϕ) stands for whatever (cases u nil ⊥ cons x1, z let x2, . . . , xn+1
be z in ϕ) does. It is a theorem that
(∗)〈〈[x1, . . . , xn | ϕ], x1 :: . . . :: xn :: NIL〉〉∼ ϕ
for any n ≥ 0.
The theory can be developed much as in [Plo90]. There is a logical
fixed-point theorem: for any t[x] there is a ϕ such that ϕ ∼ t[ϕ]. To see
this, take ϕ to be 〈〈4,4 :: NIL〉〉 where 4 is [x | t[〈〈x, x :: NIL〉〉]], and use
(∗). Now one can see the undefinability of facticity which here means that
for any ψ[x] the three sequents Sψ[x], ψ[x] ⇒ x, x ⇒ ψ[x] are inconsistent
with the theory (cf. [Plo90] where we can assert undefinability within the
theory). For taking ϕ ∼ ¬ψ[ϕ] one gets first that Sϕ (as Sψ[ϕ]) and second
that ϕ ∼ ¬ϕ (as ϕ ∼ ¬ψ[ϕ] and ψ[ϕ] ∼ ϕ). But ϕ ∼ ¬ϕ yields ϕ ⇒⊥,
which yields ¬ϕ as Sϕ and then we get the contradiction, ⊥, from ¬ϕ and
ϕ ∼ ¬ϕ.
Other undefinability results can be derived. For example there is no ϕ[x]
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defining soahood in that the sequents Sϕ[x] and ϕ[x] ⇔ Sx are inconsistent
with the theory. (Here ψ ⇔ ψ′ abbreviates the two sequents ψ ⇒ ψ′ and
ψ′ ⇒ ψ.) For otherwise, since S((0 = 0) | x) ⇔ x is derivable, we could
then define facticity by ψ[(0 = 0) | x]. One can get intensionality results.
For example it is inconsistent to assert that there are at most n facts (for
any n ≥ 0). Formally, it is inconsistent to have n constants a1, . . . , an and
the sequents: x ⇔ (x = a1) ∨ . . . ∨ (x = an) as this immediately gives a
definition of facticity. Similarly, it is inconsistent to assert that there are at
most n soas.
Adding non-monotone connectives to the logic also ressults in inconsisten-
cies in that the theory becomes inconsistent. For example, suppose the




Suppose too we keep the elimination rule as it is and drop the S-rules (to
avoid other inconsistencies!). Then we would still get an inconsistency by
taking a logical fixed-point ϕ ∼ (ϕ ⊃⊥). This is a variant of the usual
inconsistencies in illative logic. It should be possible to formulate a general
result along these lines (cf. [Plo90]).
Finally we remark that it is straightforward to construct a model of the
theory using the technique employed by Aczel in [Acz80] to construct Frege
structures, say along the lines of [Plo90].
4 Illative Logic and Standard Logic
By “standard” we mean the logic advocated in [Plo90] which is a first-order
logic allowing variable-binding to occur in terms - except that we forbid
function variables, in keeping with the illative logic. Let Σ be a signature as
above. We show that every illative theory can be conservatively extended
to a standard one over Σ which is Σ, extended by unary predicate symbols
fact and soa.
Specifically let L be the following set of “logical axioms” (obtained by
writing down the logical schemas formally).
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Judgments fact(x) ⊃ soa(x)
Sequential Implication soa(x ⊃ y) ≡ soa(x) ∧ (fact(x) ⊃ soa(y))
soa(x ⊃ y) ⊃ (fact(x ⊃ y) ≡ fact(x) ⊃ fact(y))
Existential Quantification soa(∃xt[x]) ≡ ∀xsoa(t[x])
soa(∃xt[x]) ⊃ (fact(∃xt[x]) ≡ ∃xfact(t[x]))
Equality soa(x = y)
fact(x = y) ≡ (x = y)
plus corresponding axioms for ⊥,∧,∨, |, ∀. Note the overloading of the sym-
bols ⊥,∧, . . .; this could be avoided by using the dot convention with ∧̇, ∨̇, . . .
in Σ.
Now a translation of judgments and sequents is given by:
ϕ =def fact(ϕ)
Sϕ =def soa(ϕ)
(J1, . . . , Jn ⇒ J)− =def J1 ∧ . . . ∧ Jn ⊃ J
Conservative Extension Theorem: For any set T of sequents and
any sequent seq
T ` seq iff T ,L ` seq
(where T =def {seq|seq ∈ T} )
Proof: The theorem is proved semantically using the consistency and
completeness theorems for the two logics. To any interpretation, M =
〈F ,Soa, Fact, H〉 of Σ one assigns an interpretation M = 〈F ,H〉 which
validates the logical axioms, L : H | Σ = H | Σ and H(fact) = Fact,
H(soa) = Soa. Conversely to any interpretationN = 〈F ,H〉 which validates
L we can assign an interpretation N = 〈F , Soa, Fact, H〉 in the evident way.
Note that M = M and N = N . Note too that for any sequent, seq, and
any M: M |= seq iff M |= seq. Using the correspondences one then proves
directly that T |= seq iff T , L |= seq 2
Applying this result to the above theory of relations we get a theory
closer to that in [Plo90]. As it stands the latter theory seems too strong:
one should weaken the induction scheme for arities to:
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fact(t[0]) ∧ (∀l arity(l) ⊃ fact(t[l] ⊃ t[l + 1])) ⊃ ∀l arity(l) ⊃ fact(t[l])
and should also change the axioms for unsaturated soas so that the implicit
quantification is in accord with the one employed in the illative logic. There
is then an evident translation of the present relational theory, T , to the
(amended) old one, T ′, such that if T ` seq then T ′ ` seq but we could not
prove it conservative.
In the standard theory, T , L one has strictly greater expressive power
than T . For example one cannot express the formula ¬fact(x) by a closed
term, NF in that for any closed term NF , ¬fact(x) ≡ fact(〈〈NF, x〉〉) is
inconsistent with the theory (take a logical fixed-point, t ∼〈〈NF, t〉〉 and
derive fact(t) ≡ ¬fact(t)). This means that we cannot assign to every
formula ϕ of the theory a Gödel-term, “ϕ” with the same free variables such
that
ϕ ≡ fact(“ϕ”)
holds for otherwise we could take NF = [x | “¬fact(x)”] in the above and
get a contradiction.
5 Illative Logic and Three-Valued Logic
Barwise suggested amending the standard logic to a three-valued one, and
we now show that this idea works in general. First we sketch a three-valued
variation on the standard logic. We retain the syntax of the standard logic
except that we forbid function variables. Interpretations are structures N
= 〈F ,H〉 just as before except that for any predicate symbol P of arity n,
H(P ) = 〈D,T 〉 with T ⊂ D ⊂ Obn. One defines tN [s] as before but now
as well as the satisfaction relation |=, one also has a decision relation (= (cf.
Kamp and Veltmann’s |=+ and |=− (see [vB85]). The clauses for the truth
conditions correspond to the above logical schemas, we just give examples.
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Atomic Formulas N (= P (t1, . . . , tn)[s] (resp |=) iff 〈tN1 [s], . . . , tNn [s]〉 ∈ PN2
(resp PN1 )
Equality N (= t = u[s], and N|= t = u[s] iff tN [s] = uN [s]
Sequential Implication N (= ϕ ⊃ ψ[s] iff N (= ϕ[s] and ifN |= ϕ[s] then N (= ψ[s]
N |= ϕ ⊃ ψ[s] iff N (= ϕ ⊃ ψ[s] and if N |= ϕ[s] then
N |= ψ[s]
Existential Quantification N (= ∃xϕ[s] iff N (= ϕ[s[a/x]] for every a in Ob
N |= ∃xϕ[s] iff N (= ∃xϕ[s] and N |= ϕ[s[a/x]] for
some a in Ob
Then sequents have the form seq = ϕ1, . . . , ϕn ⇒ ϕ; one defines N |= seq
to mean that for any s if N|= ϕi[s] (all i)then N |= ϕ[s]. Then T |= seq is
defined in the evident way—we not not give an axiomatisation.
Now let Σ be an illative signature, and consider three-valued extensions
over Σ which is Σ extended by a unary predicate symbol fact. Let now L3
be the set of sequents:
Sequential Implication fact(x ⊃ y) ∼ fact(x) ⊃ fact(y)
Existential Quantification fact(∃xt[x]) ∼ ∃xfact(t[x])
Equality fact(x = y) ∼ x = y
Restriction fact(x | y) ⇔ fact(x) ∧ fact(y)
fact(x | y) ↓⇔ fact(x) ↓ ∧fact(y)
plus corresponding sequents for ⊥,∧,∨, ∀ (here ϕ ∼ ψ abbreviates the four
sequents ϕ ⇒ ψ, ψ ⇒ ϕ, ϕ ↓⇒ ψ ↓ and ψ ↓⇒ ϕ ↓, where in turn, ϕ ↓=def
ϕ ∨ ¬ϕ).
Now a translation of judgments and sequents is given by:
ϕ =def fact(ϕ)
Sϕ =def fact(ϕ) ↓
(J1, . . . , Jn ⇒ J)− =def J1, . . . , Jn ⇒ J
Semantic Conservative Extension Theorem: For any set, T , of
sequents and any sequent, seq:
T |= seq iff T , L3 |= seq
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Proof: (Outline) As before one gives a one-one correspondence be-
tween illative interpretations and three-valued models of L3. To M =
〈F , Soa, Fact,H〉 one assigns M = 〈F ,H〉 with H | Σ = H | Σ and
H(fact) = 〈Soa, Fact〉, with the evident converse assignment. One notes
that M |= seq iff M |= seq and the result follows. 2
In the three-valued logic to every formula ϕ corresponds a Gödel-term,
“ϕ” obtained by replacing every occurrence of fact(t) by t.
Internalisation Theorem: For any formula ϕ: L3 ` ϕ ∼ fact(“ϕ”)
Proof: One shows by induction on ϕ that for any model N of L3
and any s that N |= ϕ[s] iff N |= fact(“ϕ”)[s], and N (= ϕ[s] iff N (=
fact(“ϕ”)[s]. 2
The internalisation theorem shows that the three-valued logic is equally
as expressive as the illative logic (in that they express the same partial
relations in a given model). The price paid for internalisation is that the
predicate, fact, is necessarily partial: with T being the above relational
theory there is a term t (take t ∼ ¬t) such that T, L3 |= fact(t) ↓⇒⊥
There are other possible choices of three-valued logic. One can vary
the connectives and the definitions of the quantifiers and also one can vary
the definition of the validity of a sequent. It is not at all known what
would result from variations of the second kind. Variations of the first
kind should be able to be accommodated by varying the illative logic: one
would still expect a conservative extension theorem and an internalisation
theorem. However in general one would expect that, if the logic admitted a
non-monotone connective then internalisation would be inconsistent with a
theory, like those above, with logical fixed-points.
For example suppose we added to the above logic a symbol, f , for an
n-ary non-monotone connective and consider illative signatures Σ which
always contain f as a functional symbol of arity ((), n). Then with Σ as
above, if we were to take L3 as above, and add
fact(f(x1, . . . , xn)) ∼ f(fact(x1), . . . , fact(xn))
then the resulting theory would be inconsistent if we took T to be the theory
of relations considered above.
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